
Transplanting the Audit Committee in Korean Soil

Kon Sik Kim Seoul National University



CORPORATE AUDITORS

- Creature of the Japanese Code
- Appointed at the GSM to monitor the board
- Power over accounting as well as operational matters
- No power to appoint or dismiss directors or officers
- ♦ Fail to play a significant role

AUDIT COMMITTEE

- Commercial Code: revised in 1999 to allow a corporation to establish an audit committee in place of a corporate auditor
- The Securities Transaction Act (applicable to listed firms): revised to require a large listed firm to establish an audit committee
- ♦ Pressure from IMF, IBRD

Response to Audit Committee

- Business Community: hostile
- Legal Commentators: hostile
- Government made compromises
- Result: mixture of corporate auditors and the U.S. style audit committee

Adoption of Audit Committee

	Listed firms	Firms with Audit Co	Manda- tory	Volun- tary
2004	666	132	74	57
2005	662	136	77	59

Grounds of Criticism

- Self-audit: participation of the members in the board may be better to restrain questionable management behavior
- Subordinate nature of the audit committee: power specified by the statutes, not delegated by the board
- Too much work for part-time outside directors: it will depend on the role the audit committee is expected to play

Audit Committee vs.Corp. Auditor


Collegial organ

- Participating in the decision-making process of the board
- Power to dismiss and appoint CEO
- Q: Is it desirable as a matter of policy to require firms to adopt the audit committee in place of the corporate auditor?

Unique Features of the Audit Committee in Korea

- ♦ Selected at GSM 3% limit applicable
- Former regulator as financial expert
- ♦ Full time member
- Operation audit
- Separate staff supporting the audit committee?

Audit Committee



What should the audit committee do?

- Power of the audit committee extensive, covering almost every aspect of business operation
- The audit committee enjoys a considerable amount of discretion as long as it is not in violation of the Korean equivalent of fiduciary duty
- In theory, too much, as well as too little, action may result in liability. But it may be difficult in practice to hold the audit committee liable for too much action.

Liability of the Audit Committee Minimum Best Practice Maximum 0----* A B C D

*Liability if it falls in Zone A or Zone D
*Minimum, Best Pr., Maximum are all unclear
*It will be difficult in practice to hold the audit committee liable for excessive audit (D)
*The problem with the audit committee has been too little action (A): possibility of too much action?

Likelihood of too much action

- Risk averse director
- Overly enthusiastic director
- Director with nothing else to do
- Director interested in expanding its influence
- Ignorant director

Costs of too much action

- Equipped with the power to conduct an operation audit, an activist audit committee may slow down, if not cripple, decision-making process
- Competent people tend to be busy and may want to avoid serving on the audit committee
- Signs of too much action? : full-time member, separate supporting staff

How to discourage too much action?

- Clarify minimum to reduce uncertainty involved: court's role
- Persuade the court not to ask too much of the audit committee
- Develop best practice as soon as possible

Future of the Audit Committee in Korea?

- The power of operation audit has been given primarily because the legislators were not sure of the independence of the board
- As outside directors become more reliable, there is less justification for the operation audit
- Without the operation audit function, the audit committee will be more like the one in U.S.

Concluding remarks

- Convergence in form believed to be more difficult to achieve than convergence in function
- Convergence in form, but no convergence in substance?
- ♦ Situation in the U.S. thirty years ago?
- A longer-term perspective is recommended

Thank you!